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WORLD-POLITICS.

LONDON: ST. PETERSBURG: BERLIN: WASHINGTON.

LONDON, *July, 1906.*

THE terrible accident that, in the early hours of July 1st, wrecked the boat express from Plymouth and caused the death of over twenty American passengers made, I need hardly say, a deep impression upon England. Until the official inquiry has been held, it is, of course, premature to guess how and why it happened, but popular and non-expert opinion inclines to ascribe it to the fatal combination of too high a speed with too light a load. Accidents of such magnitude, or indeed of any magnitude at all, are, happily, exceedingly rare in England, where the safety of those who work on the railroads and of those who travel by them has been provided for in a thousand stringent and microscopic regulations, and by the enforced use of every apparatus and device that can minimize danger. But when accidents happen, public opinion is at once aroused, insists upon all the facts coming to light, and unflinchingly supports the Board of Trade in whatever reforms officialdom may demand.

American railway men, who have talked of Mr. Roosevelt's Rate Bill as an unwarrantable interference with private enterprise, must often thank their stars that they do not live in England. Here the Board of Trade has almost plenary power of compelling a railway to adopt any system or appliance that promises to add to the security of railway employees or of the travelling public. Under its statutory authority to make proper regulations "for removing the dangers and risks incidental to railway service," there is scarcely any detail of railway management and working that lies beyond its scope. The railway directors have sense enough not to fight the Board of Trade. As much as possible, they work in harmony with it. Before any

regulation is issued, the railways are fully heard, and the new rule, in nine cases out of ten, represents an agreement between the company and the Government. There is attached to the Board of Trade what is known as an "Accidents Branch," composed of four Royal Engineers as inspectors, and two practical railroad men as their assistants. Whenever an accident occurs, a full report of it has to be furnished to the Government by the railways themselves. This regulation must be complied with whether there have been any casualties or not. When an accident is serious—and in England almost every accident is held by public opinion to be serious—the Government inspectors visit the scene, hold a public inquiry, examine witnesses and report to the Board of Trade. Their recommendations are all but invariably adopted and new rules and regulations, based upon them, are issued at once, and not only issued but enforced.

I happened to find myself at a small country station in Surrey a day or two before the Salisbury catastrophe. Many trains passed through it in the course of the day, but few stopped—not, I think, more than one an hour. Yet at this little village station, where a hundred passengers a day would be considered a heavy traffic, I found every possible provision for the public safety. On either side of the double track ran platforms, solid, asphalted, each a hundred and twenty yards long. An overhead bridge connected them. If you tried to cross the rails by the simple American expedient of stepping over them, you were peremptorily ordered back by the station-master, a faultless official in blue coat with gold buttons. All the appointments of the booking-office and waiting-rooms were sufficient and substantial. There was no approach to the tracks except through the station, and the only approaches to the station consisted of the main road and a rural by-path that was fenced for eternity. So far as the eye could reach, a man could have got on to the rails only by an act of deliberate and troublesome trespass. He would have had to climb to do it. A little beyond one end of the platforms was a grade crossing, protected by a double set of heavily barred gates. The gates were worked by lever from the signal-box, and the levers could only be moved when the track signals were properly adjusted. So far as human precautions could prevent it, no accident could possibly happen at such a place. And not only, I may add, had everything been done to insure safety, but the station

and all its surroundings, in the quiet and fragrance of that June evening, seemed like a miniature paradise. The booking-office and waiting-rooms were covered with flowering creepers and along the entire length of both platforms rose-bushes and carnations, irises and geraniums, had been planted out in rich orderliness.

In everything except its beauty that little station was typical of the whole railroad system of England. The preventives against accident I found operative there are in force over every mile of every railroad throughout the entire kingdom; and that the English railroads are worked with an absolute minimum of risk to passengers and employees and to the public at large is, I think, unquestionable. By the use of the block system on all double-track roads, and of the electric "staff," or ticket system, on all single-track roads, by protecting with automatic interlocking gates and signals the comparatively few level crossings that still exist, by thoroughly guarding the tracks by hedges, walls and fences and imposing heavy fines upon trespassers, by providing ample facilities for overhead or underground crossings from platform to platform, and by maintaining a Government department authorized not only to investigate all accidents, but to suggest and enforce measures to safeguard against their recurrence, the English railroads have probably become the safest in the world. I say "probably," because I have no recent statistics of accidents on the Continental lines. Compared, however, with the workings of the American railroad system, Great Britain makes a remarkable showing. Mr. J. D. Whelpley, who recently investigated the subject, writes that, "with a train mileage less than half that of the American roads, the English roads in 1903 hauled twice as many passengers, conducted their business on one-tenth the trackage, and in doing so killed but one-tenth as many people and injured less than one-tenth as many. If the fatalities occurring in England be classified, and those due solely to train movement be compared with the fatalities incurred on American roads from similar causes, the results will show tremendously to the advantage of English operation." In 1903, some 10,000 people were killed and 75,000 injured through the workings of American railroads; while in England 1,159 were killed and 6,785 were injured. More than one-half of the deaths on the English lines were caused by the carelessness of individual passengers, and over 150 were suicides. In the same year, there were 6,167 collisions

and 4,476 derailments in the United States, and 111 collisions and 80 derailments in the United Kingdom. Considering that the density of English traffic is six to one greater than that of American traffic, and that the English roads have to operate within an area little larger than the State of New York, their comparative immunity from accidents is all the more wonderful.

Thirty years ago, it was the usual thing for Europe, and especially for England, to be pessimistic as to the future of the United States. No prediction was more common than that there was bound to be a "big smash-up" in America sooner or later. The foreboding was based in the main on the observation of political facts—such facts, for instance, as are embodied in the problem of the continued existence and activities of Tammany Hall. Mr. Bryce's book on the American Commonwealth with its curious mingling of optimism and Godkinism did much to turn opinion in a more hopeful direction, and the feeling of despondency with which the outside world watched American developments gradually died away. But it is now reviving in all, and more than all, its old force; and it differs from the pessimism of the seventies in being based on a review of economic as well as political conditions. The "literature of exposure" has found readers outside the American Continent, and the effect of its successive sensations on the public mind of Great Britain can scarcely be overrated. From one end of the country to the other you will not find any one doubting that American commercial morality is rotten, and that the United States, while a democracy in name, is governed in reality by a shameless and corrupting plutocracy. It is felt that a dehumanized wage-system, a tyrannizing and unscrupulous capitalism and a blind popular unrest are driving the country to the very edge of a great convulsion. I may note, in this connection, that the article by "X," in the June number of this REVIEW, entitled "An Appeal to our Millionaires," has been seized upon as highly significant of the crisis through which America appears to be passing.

But these sentiments and these fears did not in any way prevent Englishmen from joining, as usual, with Americans in the celebration of Independence Day, a festival that has now taken permanent rank in the national calendar. The callers at the American Embassy on July 4th comprised this year, as last year and as always, some of the most distinguished names in English

public life; and the English speakers at the banquet in the evening gave familiar and sincere expression to the desire, which on this side of the Atlantic is unanimous, that England and the United States, while politically separate, should continue to be one in sympathies and interests. To a reflective mind, there is something that speaks well for the British character in this national eagerness to participate in the commemoration of the birthday of American independence. It is true that a hundred and thirty years have passed since the day that marked the greatest disaster in English history; but the ready and handsome manner in which Englishmen of the highest position and authority do yearly penance for their ancestors' share in provoking the American Revolution is none the less a rare and ingratiating trait. When you get down to the bottom of the case, there can be no doubt that Englishmen as a whole, in spite of this scandal and of that, are proud of America, and that many of them think that Britain's chief title to a foremost place in the roll of history may ultimately prove to be the chance or design that led to her colonization of America and to the endowment of her giant offspring with English laws, the English language, and the English type of civilization.

British politics during the past month have been almost absorbed by the Education Bill—a measure that, starting out by being a sectarian answer to a sectarian attack, has now been developed by amendments and concessions into something like a national and permanent settlement of the “religious difficulty.” But by all odds the most interesting political event of the month was the great demonstration that took place in Birmingham, on July 7th and 9th, in honor of Mr. Chamberlain's seventieth birthday. It was a wholly non-partisan tribute of affection and admiration by the people of Birmingham and of the surrounding districts to their great fellow citizen; and it was a tribute that not even his most convinced opponent grudged him in the least. There have been few things in the history of modern English politics more curious or more honorable than the way in which Mr. Chamberlain, through all the vagaries of his career, has stuck to Birmingham and the way in which Birmingham has stuck to Mr. Chamberlain. So far as I can recall at this moment, he is the only British statesman of first rank who is absolutely identified with a town. Politically, no one ever thinks of Mr. Chamber-

lain without also thinking of Birmingham, or of Birmingham without also thinking of Mr. Chamberlain. Most of the men who reach Cabinet rank in England spring from the aristocracy and its offshoots, the great landowning and county families; and among the remainder it is quite exceptional to find a Minister who has kept up his connection with his old city. The town magnate's usual way of showing that he is a magnate is to cut his connection with the city, to get clear of the surroundings in which he has spent his working life, to go into the country and become a county, instead of merely a suburban, grandee. This is especially likely to be the case if he interests himself in politics, for the atmosphere on the upper levels of English politics is still palpably territorial. Mr. Chamberlain has either never felt this temptation or has been able to resist it. His home is still in Birmingham; in London he has merely a house; and he has never had, and never will have, a country place. His private interests centre absolutely in the town where he settled as a boy of eighteen. There most of his relatives live, and there he goes at once to relieve the strain of London and Parliamentary life. It is thirty years since he held any municipal office; yet, in all that time, there has been no movement of local importance to which he has not contributed his invaluable energy and guidance. Whatever it may be, a new public park, an art gallery, or a university, Mr. Chamberlain is ready on the instant to throw himself into it as though outside interests were non-existent. He has contrived, in short, to be at once a great local and a great national force; and for this alone Birmingham does well to honor him. He began his public life with an intense desire to create and develop a feeling of civic patriotism in the people of his adopted locality. He preached, and if the phrase may be pardoned, he practised, a pride in Birmingham such as the Greeks in classical times and the Italians of the Middle Ages felt in their cities. He held up the ideal of a self-sufficing town, with stately public institutions and a dignified and efficient public life, not dependent upon London or Oxford for picture-galleries, museums, libraries or a university, but in all things complete in itself. In the faith of that ideal he has never ceased to toil, and it received a magnificent vindication when Birmingham gave itself up for the best of two days to honoring the man who had forced it to be proud of itself. On that part of Mr. Chamberlain's record, at any rate, there is not a flaw.

ST. PETERSBURG, *July, 1906.*

RUSSIA might yet, perhaps, be saved from the most gruesome aspects of a sanguinary revolution, if there were one powerful, strong-willed man among the confidential advisers of the Tsar. For there are numerous sections of the population whose views are still reasonable and whose conduct is perfectly normal. And there are several social and political institutions yet intact, whose functions might readily be adjusted to the new demands and whose working might be rendered superlatively beneficent. The finances, too, are in a much better state than those of Italy, Austria or even Germany would have been, had they undergone ordeals like the war with Japan and the Russian general strikes. The tone of the village communities is hale and vigorous. The machinery of the intermediate and higher education is efficient, if only it were working. The majority of law-judges are generally men of honor and spirit, who would scorn to do an unrighteous deed or connive at an injustice which they could remedy. In a word, the Tsardom is like an engine taken to pieces. All or nearly all the parts are there; and, though some be spoiled or useless, others might more or less easily be substituted for them. But there must first come forward an engineer to put the parts together; and, until he has appeared, the engine is no better than a heap of scrap iron.

Unfortunately, there is no strong man near the Russian monarch, not even a daring and resolute one. General Trepoff, who is become a sort of hidden Grand Vizier, is the nearest approach to a Cæsar or Napoleon. His best quality is personal intrepidity, but he is devoid of statesmanlike sagacity and foresight. His police measures for the personal safety of the Tsar are admitted to be effectual and his intentions are avowedly good; but his political horizon is scarcely broader than a gypsy's, while his notion of political tactics is as crude as that of a cowboy. Yet Trepoff is the wirepuller of the Imperial Court and of a large section of the Russian Empire. It is he who has the ear of Nicholas, the last of Russia's Autocrats, and he judges, cannot but judge, the significance of every event, the seasonableness of every measure, the effect of each modification of policy, according to its relation to the one aim and object of his life—the Tsar's personal safety.

The Court party, of which the General is at present the soul,

and, unhappily, one must add, the brains as well, has been playing its cards most unskilfully. To begin with, the policy of the Crown being what it is, there ought never to have been an electoral law so liberal as that in accordance with which the country chose its delegates. But, once the law was issued, the friends of the monarch were bound in self-defence to take a leaf from the book of other governments, to found a political party and to influence the elections. Count Witté, however, refused categorically to meddle with the electorate. That he was asked and repeatedly asked to bring pressure to bear upon the voters I know; but he was deaf to arguments. Again, the elections over, and the relative strength of the parties once ascertained, it would probably have been politic to leave the creator of the Duma free to deal with his creation. Count Witté was willing to remain in office and form a homogeneous cabinet, if he had received the needful powers. But the Emperor would not listen to such a suggestion. He was resolved all along to dismiss the first premier as soon as might be, and to inaugurate what one may aptly term the "Pound-of-flesh" policy. What he had promised he would give, fully, unstintingly, but not an iota more.

To the impartial outsider who has no axe to grind in Russia it may seem that the proper course to take after Witté's dismissal would have been to appoint Ministers more liberal than he, or at any rate not less so. The Tsar, on the contrary, chose men who were notoriously the political adversaries of Count Witté, as well as his personal enemies. The result was to revolutionize the country. On the eve of the day on which he welcomed the Deputies as Russia's "best men," the Emperor surrounded himself by a circle of counsellors who, one might say, wished, if not these Deputies, at least the charter of their Duma, at the bottom of the Gulf of Finland, and were resolved to see that nothing more than the pound of flesh was cut out of the Autocracy, not one fibre more. A fruitful cooperation between such Ministers and a democratic Duma was as inconceivable as a useful combination of fire and water. The two institutions spoke different languages from the outset. They lacked a common platform. They could only hinder, not help, each other. And, as the Emperor has hitherto identified himself with the Ministry, his interests are beginning to be looked upon by the people as incompatible with those of the nation. The traditional worship of the Autocrat is ceasing, and

fears are entertained lest the worshippers, turned iconoclasts, may insist on invading the temple and shattering the idol. Everywhere the view is now being put forward that, so long as the Court camarilla is not abolished, there will be no order, no peace, no prosperity in the land. "The Augean stable," stump orators exclaim, "must be completely cleansed, and by a river of blood. Until that is done the new framework of the Government cannot be built upon the site of the old." The Duma is composed, they add, of very moderate men with whom any well-meaning Cabinet could have worked in harmony; but, Goremykin and his colleagues being bent on thwarting all its legislative efforts, no business could be transacted.

The Government is seemingly aware of its mistake and desirous of drawing the practical consequences from the discovery, but, as usual, too late. The Deputies, who hitherto felt confident that the Crown would shrink from dissolving or even proroguing the Duma, have lost their certitude. They are now discussing their attitude in the contingency of an Imperial ukase appearing in the "Government Messenger" sending them to their homes for the summer vacations. Some members propose that the assembly counteract in advance the effect of such an order, by decreeing that there shall be no vacations until the chief planks in its political programme have become embodied in laws. Others have made different suggestions. But in all probability what will happen is this: the Imperial ukase will be duly issued and the Duma will bow to it, because to do otherwise would be an act of open rebellion; and, if would-be lawmakers began their career by turning lawbreakers, they would find and deserve little sympathy when the Crown dismissed them to their homes altogether. But, whatever the attitude of the Deputies, the final result will probably be the same. The Duma will be dissolved and new elections ordered, over which the Government will presumably do more than merely preside. Whether Russia will be the better for this fresh casting of the die is doubtful. The minds of the great bulk of the people are unsettled. Their hopes have been raised absurdly high. Their passions are aroused and their moral principles shaken. They no longer look to the Government for guidance, and, if they did, they would find none. Therefore they follow the lead of professional revolutionists. On the other hand, the people in the opposite camp are equally bewildered, equally excited.

They, too, follow leaders who are not less revolutionary because they hoist the flag of the Autocracy and vociferously cheer for the Tsar. Both parties employ violence and take human life with utter ruthlessness. And the shock of these hostile armies will shake the Russian Empire to its foundations.

The bulk of the people are benighted, superstitious, ignorant, to a degree which Americans can hardly realize. Hence they are open to all kinds of hypnotizing suggestions from without, while incapable of any deliberate action on their own initiative. A few years ago, thousands of them wanted to take part in the South-African War on the Boer side; and, when asked why their sympathies went out to the Dutch, they answered: "Because they are Orthodox Christians of our Church, and the English are forcing them to become heretics." When discussing among themselves the causes of the success of the Japanese over their own countrymen, many of them agreed that it was owing to the fact that the Japanese could assume the form of microbes and get into the boots of the Russian soldiers, biting their legs and causing death. They kill doctors whenever there is an epidemic of cholera, accusing the doctors of poisoning the wells and spreading the disease deliberately. They burn witches with delight, disinter the dead to lay a ghost; they strip unfaithful wives stark naked, tie them to carts, and whip them through the village. In a word, the level of civilization in the rural districts is lower than that of the Chinese or the Mongols. And when a multitude like this, which differs from savages only in a slight degree, is roused to madness, the results of their rising in arms may be tremendous.

A few concrete instances may serve as illustrations of the mental mechanism and present mood of the angry peasants, to whom unwise politicians have held out hopes of gratuitous land in quantities that do not exist in the Empire. The peasants of a canton recently met to discuss the best line of policy for their Deputy in the Duma to adopt, and had it committed to paper in presence of the rural chief, who, being like themselves unable to read or write, affixed his mark. The document, which was really drawn up by some obscure agitator, was addressed to their representative in the Duma, and the "instructions" they gave him ran as follows: "A band of landowners, grown fat on our sweat and blood, has taken possession of our land and rides roughshod over the laws of God and man. Our patience is at an end. We demand

a definite answer. Otherwise, we peasants, tortured and driven to desperation, are ready for anything. A curse upon all who do not wish well to the nation and follow the enemy."

An acquaintance of mine, Prince T., told me one of his recent experiences a couple of days ago:

"I have always got on well with my peasants. They paid me very moderate rents, and received from me work every year which brought them in a good forty or fifty per cent. of their total earnings. And down to this year they were well disposed towards me, always ready to give me a kind word and do me a good turn. But now they take a pleasure in being offensive. One of them will sidle up till he is actually rubbing shoulders with me; then he will crane his neck, putting his face in front of mine, and with a leer exclaim in a sneering tone of voice: 'Now, Your Excellency, we peasants have our eyes opened. We understand what our rights are, and we are going to get them too. The land is ours and you have stolen it. You are vampires. You suck our blood. We are going to get our land back. And that's why we won't complete the purchase of your estate that we were nearly doing the other day. We won't burn down your house, because it will soon be ours.' Now, among others, there is one man to whom I have tried to be especially good. He has almost continuous employment on my estate, and I pay him a retaining fee all the year round. Well, the other day, he assembled his fellow peasants and spent a couple of hours in reading the newspapers to them, trying to persuade them to plunder my belongings and burn down my manor. They refused, however, on the ground that it would be bad policy, because everything of mine, house and land, would shortly be theirs for nothing. And so my house escaped. But the most curious part of the story is the sequel. That same fellow afterwards came to me himself and told me what he had done. Not in a bragging or provocative spirit, nor in a repentant mood, but simply and unaffectedly, with no accompanying ethical note of praise or blame. His soul was naked and he was unashamed, but not because of his innocence; only because his notions of right and wrong are perverted."

What my friend said of his peasants may without great unfairness be predicated of a large section of the Russian people. Their moral sense is distorted. Hence rapine, arson, assassination, and mass murders by bomb-throwing are of every-day occurrence, and the only expression of public opinion which they evoke is regret that the criminals should be brought to punishment. "Patriotism, not criminal instinct, inspired them."

And, to shame the Government into dispensing with capital punishment altogether, lads in their teens are most frequently pushed to the front to perpetrate the sanguinary deeds which surprise Russia's foreign friends. Almost every telegraphic message

announcing the slaying and wounding of a multitude of harmless people, adds: "The bomb-thrower was a lad of seventeen or eighteen." In some cases he was only fifteen.

In Odessa, two bombs were thrown at General Nepluyeff which wounded one hundred and killed fourteen members of the public, many of them children and women who had assembled to watch the military review. Scores were crippled, arms, heads, legs, fingers, intestines lay heaped upon the ground until they were taken away and put in barrels to be kept for burial. General Nepluyeff himself, however, was not even wounded. One of the bomb-throwers was killed by his own explosive; another was sent for trial, but, as he is not quite sixteen years old, his lawyers refuse to have him treated as an adult. The case will come on in about a fortnight. In Warsaw, a dozen State alcohol-shops were attacked in broad daylight and some persons were killed and wounded. Two days later, the Socialist party announced in the press that it assumed responsibility for the twelve attacks, the motive being to prove clearly that the repressive measures enforced by the authorities were useless. And all this is printed generally without comment.

What could be more idyllic than the scene briefly outlined in the newspaper telegrams as follows: "In Eupatoria, a number of workmen, dissatisfied with the amount of their wages, made common cause with the unemployed and—burned down the land-owner's mill. The town council then invited them to tea and organized gratuitous dinners and teas for them, after which they became tranquil and destroyed nothing more. Life is quite normal here." Normal indeed! What will it resemble when it relapses into an abnormal state? people ask. Here is a brief extract from one issue of the principal newspaper in Russia, giving a summary of the day's news:

"In Warsaw, police superintendent Kozell has been killed. An attempt has been made on the life of the vice-director of the police there. In the same city, a bomb has been thrown into the dwelling of an employer of labor. In the Kutais prison, the overseer, Kulghin, well known for his humane treatment of prisoners, has been stoned to death. In Yekaterinoslav, M. Yanoffsky, director of the provincial penitentiary, has been killed. In the Ust Katav works, the foreman has been wounded by a bomb and his wife killed. In Talsen, the Lutheran clergyman has been slain in the woods. In Lodz, a skirmish has taken place between Socialists and Nationalists. In the village of Voronesh, 313 huts have been burned to ashes."

One is reminded sometimes of the Old World stories told by Herodotus. One night, near the Polish station Demblin, a railway employee, named Jan Kowalchyk, was awakened by the shattering of the glass in his bedroom window. Burglars, calling themselves revolutionists, had come to the gate, but, finding it locked, were striving to get in at the window. As Jan's wife was in great danger of being killed by the bullets which were plentifully poured into the bedroom, it was she who broke silence and besought the ruffians to spare her life. "Give us all your money, then, and be right quick about it!" was the answer. The woman, quaking with terror, opened a chest and handed them twenty-seven rubles, but although they took the notes and silver they refused to be placated. "Let's have the rest." She assured them that that was all. Then one of the brigands, thrusting his hand through the pane, turned the revolver towards Mrs. Kowalchyk's head. She was on her knees beseeching them to have pity on her. But they were inexorable. Meanwhile, unknown to the poor woman, her husband was moving slowly and silently along the wall unseen by the revolutionaries. All at once, Kowalchyk swung his right hand, which held a sharp scythe, and brought it swiftly down by the window. The hand with the revolver, severed at the wrist, fell into the room, the assailants hurriedly retreated and the couple were left in peace. No trace of the revolutionaries has been found.

Nineteen members of the Duma have lately appealed to the Russian people, asking them to refuse taxes and generally to rebel against the present *régime*. And they have had some success. Agrarian troubles have broken out in several places, not, however, as yet on a large scale. That may come in August or September. Meanwhile, the reactionary party are also at work. They have vented their feelings on the Jews of the industrial city of Belostok, gutting shops, setting fire to dwellings, wounding Jewish citizens, and even resisting the troops which endeavored to restore order. The example of Belostok will be followed by other cities. Blood will flow profusely. Socialists, revolutionaries and reactionaries desire it, demand it. The organ of the extreme radicals writes: "From the interior of the Empire, calm, level-headed observers, who are well acquainted with what goes on among the peasants, affirm that a veritable Jacquerie is approaching. There is so much electricity in the air that the least thing may draw it out."

BERLIN, July, 1906.

THE collapse of German diplomacy, viewed in conjunction with the downfall of the autocratic *régime* in Russia, is one of the most suggestive facts in contemporary history. It signifies the passing of an era of political reaction in Europe. Russia, in the heyday of her power, had no more persistent admirers than the governing classes of Germany. She exercised, until the day of her humiliation, a decisive influence over German statesmen, who, in the contemplation of her outwardly magnificent achievements, gradually came to despise the principles of liberty embodied in the systems of France, Great Britain and the United States. Bismarck, indeed, contributed in no small measure to the estrangement of his countrymen from Great Britain by his methodic depreciation of British ideals. He excited the prejudices of the nation against the Empress Frederick, and counteracted her influence when she was Crown Princess because he conceived that, in order to prevent the development of German institutions upon British lines, it was essential to extinguish the sympathies which wide circles of the people felt for Great Britain. He lived to regret the one-sided impetus he had given to the monarchical authority; for he fell a victim to the autocratic power of the Emperor over the Executive. Under a parliamentary Government, it is probable that Bismarck would have remained at the head of affairs until his death. After his dismissal, the Emperor became, for all practical purposes, his own Chancellor. He devoted himself with singular pertinacity to the task of enhancing the prestige of the Crown at the expense of the Imperial Diet. But his efforts were not uniformly successful. The Reichstag vetoed a series of measures personally advocated by the monarch, and it was no uncommon thing, in the nineties, for the Emperor to complain, as he once did even to the President of that body, that the Tsar, owing to his immunity from parliamentary interference, was in a position incomparably more favorable than himself to promote the best interests of his Empire.

But those complaints never applied to the domain of foreign policy. In such matters the Emperor is, in sooth, a more absolute monarch than ever was his Russian brother, whose diplomatic agents were not infrequently inclined to act as the instruments of Court and Ministerial intrigues rather than of their sovereign's policy. The German Emperor appoints his own Chancellor and

Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and his Ambassadors are, as a rule, courtiers who owe their advancement entirely to his personal favor. The relations he establishes, or seeks to establish, with foreign nations are beyond all parliamentary control; for the sanction of the Reichstag is not requisite to any Treaties of Alliance he may conclude, and the Chancellor admits no obligation to furnish the Legislature with information on such matters. The Reichstag acquiesces, with apparent willingness, in this restricted view of its functions. It listens with the utmost respect to the expositions which the Chancellor may deem it advisable to address to it. Its members, unless they belong to the Social Democratic party, never press embarrassing questions; and they are instantly amenable to any invocation, on the part of the Government, of their innate feeling of awe for the cryptic mysteries of diplomacy. Many of them seem almost to regard the regulation of international affairs as an occult science, the secrets of which it is inadmissible for those beyond the magic pale to attempt to penetrate. To this feeling, which is not always identical with indifferentism, may be ascribed the fact that the Reichstag, as distinguished from the French Chamber or the British House of Commons, boasts not a single member who makes it his duty systematically to study the blue, white and yellow books issued by the various European Governments, or who has earned for himself the right to challenge attention as an acknowledged authority upon foreign affairs.

There are signs that this state of things will not permanently endure. In a former communication it was shown how considerable are the drafts which the Emperor has made on the national stock of monarchical sentiment: how men, even on the Conservative benches of the Reichstag, now listen with barely concealed gratification to the fulminations of Social Democratic orators against the itinerant politics of the sovereign, and to their insistence on his definite failure, after years of canvassing in foreign capitals, to secure the friendship of other nations for his autocratic German policy. There is, however, a growing sense that this passive indulgence of their feelings by the state-supporting parties is inadequate to the exigencies of the case: that the interests of the country imperatively demand the presence in the Reichstag of patriotic and competent critics of foreign affairs, who, in the words of Maximilian Harden, shall employ their parliamentary prerogative of free speech in order to proclaim with stentorian

voice "the last truth" concerning the existing isolation of Germany. One single deputy of this calibre, the Bismarckian publicist just mentioned observes, would immediately become a power in the land; for he would awaken the governing classes to the urgency of the Russian portent. It is plain to the minds of such writers as Harden that Germany cannot remain impervious to the lessons taught by the upheaval of Tsardom. If she desires to escape political bankruptcy, she must allow sway to the spirit of the age, which is strenuously antagonistic to absolutist tendencies. Harden himself is in favor of the adaptation to German conditions of Parliamentary Government on British lines—of the principle of ministerial responsibility to the Reichstag, instead of to the Emperor. That, of course, is a far cry. But there are symptoms that it will eventually come to be the watchword of the nation. Meanwhile, Harden draws an effective contrast between the wealth of creative and administrative genius that is employed in the great industrial shipping and banking concerns of the Empire, and the dearth of commanding personalities directly engaged in the service of the State—a dearth which was drastically illustrated at the time of Prince von Bülow's illness, when it was seriously and generally contended that the country did not contain a second statesman capable of efficiently occupying the post of Chancellor. It may be true that the Bureaucracy or the Diplomatic Service cannot produce the man required, but it is a de-
famation of the nation, Harden exclaims, to describe it as laboring under a similar disability. The simple fact of the matter is that, under the existing *régime*, the noblest minds of the Empire hold themselves rigorously aloof from political life, in just appreciation of the impossibility of finding in it a fair field for the exercise of their ambitions. But their cooperation would be immediately assured if the Reichstag were invested with a proper measure of responsibility. The Legislature would then constitute the best recruiting-ground imaginable for the political talents of the country.

The strictures thus passed by Harden upon the present representatives of the Electorate are being applied with added force, by several of his contemporaries, to the representatives of the Emperor at the various Foreign Courts. The German Ambassadors and Envoys are roundly accused of having proved themselves incapable of reading the pulse of the nations to which they are accredited, and of having encouraged, by their incompetent diag-

nostics, the commission of the political blunders that have resulted in the international isolation of Germany. The "*Vossische Zeitung*," a widely circulated Radical journal, sums up the moral of these criticisms by declaring that the time has arrived for the Government to transfer the functions of diplomacy, at all events temporarily, to the people. The countless visits paid by the Emperor to foreign potentates and courts, it says, have failed to secure for the Empire the friendship of a single nation. It therefore suggests that the Emperor and his assistants would be well advised if they were to impose upon themselves a self-denying ordinance, and to abstain from all further diplomatic demonstrations; while the people of Germany address themselves to the task of correcting the impressions created by their Government, and of cultivating a spirit of concord and good-will with the other nations of Europe.

The experiment thus proposed is already being tried. Within the past few months, the German and British nations have exchanged a series of significant courtesies. The commercial sections of both communities have proclaimed their urgent desire for a better understanding. Germany has despatched delegates from various walks of life, charged with the task of studying British institutions, and a company of municipal officials from Great Britain has travelled through Germany on a similar quest. Fifty German journalists, many of them life-long denounciators of "perfidious Albion," have journeyed to England, where they have been royally entertained by distinguished representatives of British culture; and they have returned to the Fatherland cured, at least, of their prejudices. They have assured themselves that the British nation needs peace and not war, and they will be chary in future of lending credence and publicity to those extravagant tales of impending British attacks on German seaport towns which were mainly responsible for the eager acceptance by the Reichstag of the latest Navy Bill. A more appreciative style is already perceptible in the comments of the press on Anglo-German relations. The note of denunciation has, for the moment, entirely disappeared, and the friendships formed by Great Britain with France and other countries, which until quite recently were construed in an aggressive sense, are now discussed in a commendable spirit of tolerance. There is, in fact, a manifest desire to let bygones be bygones, and to assist into prominence the pacificatory elements

of the situation. Attempts are even made to prove that Bismarck was politically a friend of Great Britain, and in support of this theory a letter is quoted which the First Chancellor once addressed to the late Earl Granville. In that letter, Bismarck complains of the difficulty of establishing a general diplomatic understanding with the British Government, owing to the indiscretions of British Cabinet Ministers and their constitutional aversion to secrecy. Though the German press is apparently insensible to the fact, the Bismarckian epistle actually reveals the essential cause of the subsequent collapse of German diplomacy—its predilection for elaborate “Reinsurance Treaties.” Prince von Bülow, as the agent of the Emperor, from the commencement of his tenure of office, has aimed at an understanding with Great Britain which he might disavow in public and in his intercourse with other Powers, while privately assuring the statesmen of Downing Street of his undeviating loyalty to its conditions. These tactics supply the keynote of the remarkable communications which Herr von Holstein, the Chief of the Political Department of the Foreign Office, made, a few days before his recent fall, to the British Ambassador in Berlin. Herr von Holstein had always been regarded in the capitals of Europe as an inveterate enemy of Great Britain; and he endeavored to clear himself of this reputation by contending that his methods, and possibly those of his Chief, had invariably kept in view the eventuality of Anglo-German cooperation. To plain men such methods seem strangely intricate; and the journalists who have returned from London, impressed with the sincerity of the British attitude, which they describe as the outcome of a frank desire for intimacy with France and for peaceful relations with Germany, will render no small service to their country if they succeed in convincing their diplomatists that straightforwardness is the best policy, even in foreign affairs.

The course of home politics is dominated by the problem of colonial administration. Prior to its adjournment last month, the Reichstag earned the approval of the Emperor by its “patriotic performance” in enacting what are mistakenly termed “Finance Reform Bills.” These measures bring about no fundamental change in the Imperial Finances. Without attempting any systematic reform, they add some fifty million dollars to the German Revenue. For many years the budgets of the Empire have labored under growing deficits; but the Government has refrained from

grappling, until the last moment, with the evil, lest its acknowledgment of the necessity of augmented taxation might lead the Reichstag to withhold its sanction from the policy of naval expansion. The consequence of this long delay is that one-half of the new taxes are required to pay the interest on the Imperial Debt, which now balances at \$750,000,000. But, after enacting these unavoidable additions to the taxpayers' burdens, the more democratic parties of the Reichstag deemed the moment peculiarly appropriate for demonstrating to the electors their determination to discourage all extravagance on the part of the Government. In a memorable sitting, accordingly, they denounced as futile the further prosecution of the native war in Southwest Africa, which is in its third year, and demanded that the German occupation should be restricted to the central parts of the Colony. Their action excited a furious protest from the military representative of the Colonial Administration, who bluntly informed the Reichstag that the Emperor alone was competent to decide when the fifteen thousand soldiers located in Southwest Africa should be withdrawn. Upon this enunciation of the principle *sic volo, sic jubeo*, the Legislature retorted by rejecting a large portion of the Colonial estimates, providing for additional expenditure on railways and for the compensation of farmers whose farms had been pillaged by the natives, as well as by refusing to vote the establishment of an Imperial Department for the Colonies under an Imperial Secretary of State—a measure declared by the Government to be essential to the efficient management of the colonies, which are at present under the control of a department of the overburdened Foreign Office. Thus the matter now stands. The incident is symptomatic of the increasing disgust of the people with the colonies, which for more than twenty years have served to drain the Imperial Exchequer without conferring any equivalent benefit on the State. But it is also instructive in its constitutional aspect; for it affords a singular example of the baneful results that occasionally attend on parliamentary irresponsibility. As the supporters of the Imperial Government have suddenly discovered for themselves, deputies, even of the democratic order, who expected to inherit the official consequences of their votes, would have hesitated many times before committing themselves to the perpetuation of the existing confusion in the administration of the colonies.

WASHINGTON, July, 1906.

THE principal topics of discussion here and now are, first, the impending campaign for the control of the next House of Representatives, and the issues likely to be pivotal in that contest; and, secondly, the significance attaching to the mission of Secretary Root, who has been deputed to represent the United States at the Pan-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro, and, subsequently, to visit the most important Spanish-American Republics, to-wit, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and Peru.

Is it possible for Democrats to overcome the majority of 114 which the Republicans possess in the Fifty-ninth Congress, or, in other words, to gain fifty-eight seats, now occupied by their opponents? On the face of things, such a revolution in public opinion seems improbable, if not incredible. It is true that an even more pronounced reversal of popular sentiment was witnessed at the late General Election in the United Kingdom. But there, besides a number of contributory grounds for an appeal to the voters, the Liberals had a definite issue, that of Free Trade *versus* Protection, in which, as it proved, a large majority of the British people felt vitally concerned. In this country, also, a tariff question must figure conspicuously in the canvass, and Democratic candidates would be glad to make the battle at the ballot-box turn exclusively upon it. There is no doubt that, in such an event, they could obtain considerable support from Republican tariff-revisionists, not only in Iowa, Wisconsin and Minnesota, but also in Massachusetts and some other Northern States. Even then, however, it is disputable whether they could secure preponderance in the next House, because the demand for tariff revision is unlikely to become wide-spread and irresistible, so long as the continuance of our unexampled prosperity seems to prove that the Dingley Tariff cannot be generally and seriously harmful.

The Republican leaders do not mean, however, to let the contest hinge upon that single issue, if they can prevent it. Speaker Cannon, who intends to take an active part in the canvass, thinks that his party's appeal to the electors should be based on the record of the Fifty-ninth Congress, which he describes as a "Congress of Achievement," giving, of course, the credit for the achievement to Republicans, because, as possessing a majority in each House, they had it in their power to enact or defeat proposed legislation. It is certain that, on the score of accomplishment, the

first session of the Fifty-ninth Congress has been phenomenal from some points of view. As regards the mere quantity of work attempted or performed, it is unparalleled. Against the 7,295 bills introduced, and the 3,465 bills passed, in the three sessions of the Fifty-eighth Congress, Mr. Cannon can point to over 26,000 bills introduced in the two Houses during the single session of the present Congress just concluded, of which some 4,300 have become laws. With respect to another kind of achievement, the expenditure of the public money, the first session of the Fifty-ninth Congress has no rival in our political annals. It seems not so long ago that the Republican party was held up to obloquy as responsible for a "Billion Dollar Congress"; yet now the lavish outlay made in a single session falls but little short of nine hundred millions.

If we turn, now, to the quality of the legislation enacted, we must acknowledge that the first session of the Fifty-ninth Congress, as a Congress, has a right to be proud of its record. Had it done nothing but pass the Railway Rate bill, the Meat Inspection bill and the Pure Food bill, it would have left a deep mark on our economical history, and deserved the gratitude of the country. But, if we closely scrutinize the circumstances under which those far-reaching and beneficent laws were placed upon the statute-book, we may well hesitate to affirm the justice of crediting their enactment to the Republican party, as a party. Beyond dispute, the primary and paramount credit for those achievements belongs to President Roosevelt. But for the influence incessantly, and persuasively or peremptorily, exercised by him, the Republican majority in the Senate, which deferred for a year even the consideration of the project, would never have passed the Railway Rate bill in its actual form. It is true that the Republican majority in the House of Representatives promptly professed to side with the Chief Magistrate in this matter in both the Fifty-eighth and the Fifty-ninth Congress; but, in the end, when the Railway Rate bill went to conference, it seemed to experience a slight change of heart, and showed itself more unwilling than the Senate to yield full assent to Mr. Roosevelt's wishes. It pursued a similar course with reference to the Meat Inspection bill and the Pure Food bill. Those measures, as enacted, would have conformed more thoroughly to the public demands if the Lower House had concurred with the Senate in carrying out more ex-

actly the programme framed and advocated by spokesmen of the Administration. Now, it is to be observed that the position taken by the President with reference to each of these three great reforms received the zealous support of every Democratic Representative and of almost every Democratic Senator. How, then, is it possible for Speaker Cannon to make good his averment that the credit for passing these bills belongs rather to the Republican than to the Democratic members of the Fifty-ninth Congress?

The hollowness of this claim is so patent to many other leaders of the Republican party that they prefer to go to the country this year on a platform cut down to the single plank, "Endorse Roosevelt!" What would be the pertinence of such an appeal? Mr. Roosevelt is not seeking an election to any office at this time, and he is not even a prospective candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency in 1908. He and his intimate friends treat as an insult the intimation that, in the teeth of his declaration to the contrary, he can be persuaded to accept such a nomination two years hence. From what other point of view does he need endorsement at the hands of the people? In order that he may prosecute and supplement the reform legislation that is already so far advanced? How would his intention to that end be thwarted by a transfer of the control of the House of Representatives from Republicans to Democrats? Of the two parties, the Democrats have given him, as we have seen, the more thoroughgoing and unwavering assistance. If it be, in truth, the endorsement of Roosevelt's reform policy that ought to determine the choice of Representatives next November, it is rather the Democrats than the Republicans who have a right to claim that the choice shall be exercised on their behalf.

Will it be alleged that it is impossible to divorce Mr. Roosevelt from the party that made him President? It was the leaders of the Republican party in the Senate who tried to bring about such a divorce, by postponing for a year consideration of the Rate-making bill that passed the House of Representatives in the last session of the Fifty-eighth Congress. If, for nearly a twelve-month, there was no solidarity in the minds of the voters between Mr. Roosevelt and the Republican majority in the Senate, it certainly was not the President's fault. It is true that the Republican majority of the Lower House in both Congresses have ostensibly favored Mr. Roosevelt's projects, but we repeat that, as

to each of the three especially important bills, to which we have above referred, Speaker Cannon and the other leaders of that majority have, by their stubborn resistance, in the House and in Conference, hindered the President from obtaining measures as perfect as he desired. Under the circumstances, it would require a good deal of assurance for Speaker Cannon to say to his constituents, "By endorsing me, you endorse Roosevelt." His Democratic competitor might have something to say about the matter. On the whole, we opine that Republican candidates will scarcely be able to divert the minds of the electors from tariff revision by either of the spurious war-cries which have been commended to them. The prevailing belief expressed by veteran politicians in Washington, when they are not talking for publication, is that the revisionists in the Republican ranks will help the Democrats to cut down the present majority of "Stand-Patters" in the Lower House, but, owing to the persistence of general prosperity, will not be able to transform it into a minority.

Of course, no sensible person imagines that our Secretary of State would have been sent to Rio de Janeiro in a war-ship to discuss such questions of more or less academic interest as were the chief things debated in the last Pan-American Conference. For such an unprecedented proceeding, there must have been a motive more relevant, more weighty and more urgent. That motive can be no other than a desire to prevent the Conference at Rio de Janeiro from committing the Latin-American States to a formal approval of the Calvo or Drago Doctrine, and inferentially from holding up to reprobation the assumption on the strength of which President Roosevelt has undertaken to collect and distribute the customs revenue of the Dominican Republic. The fundamental postulate on which the President's action is based is that powerful creditor nations have the right to exact by force the payment, not only of compensation for insults or crimes of violence, but also of contractual obligations, due from the governments or citizens of weak and indebted commonwealths. It was in pursuance of this postulate that Secretary Hay assented to the bombardment of Venezuelan seaports by British, German and Italian war vessels, and to the subsequent confiscation of a third of the customs revenue of La Guayra and Puerto Cabello for the payment of debts arising out of contracts. Still accepting the postulate, but desirous of avoiding the mischievous consequences

of its concrete application on this side of the Atlantic, Mr. Roosevelt has practically said, by the position which he has taken in the affairs of Santo Domingo, "I admit that the Italian, Belgian, German and other European creditors of the Dominican Republic have, by international usage, a right to occupy Dominican seaports, and sequester their customs duties until such debts as they may justly claim are paid; but, in order to shield a feeble American commonwealth from the fate of Egypt, I am willing to offer mediation between creditor and debtor, and to collect and apportion the revenue of the threatened delinquent in the interest of both parties." It is well known that the proposal was welcomed by the Dominican Executive, and that the European creditor-Powers have deemed it judicious to acquiesce in the arrangement.

Now the so-called "Calvo" or "Drago" Doctrine, which will be advocated at Rio de Janeiro by the spokesmen of Argentina, and which, it is known, is looked upon with favor in other Latin-American commonwealths, strikes at the root of Mr. Roosevelt's fundamental postulate. This doctrine insists that, so far as debts arising out of contract are concerned, the relation of foreign creditors to an indebted State must be governed by the maxim *caveat emptor*, and that, in default of payment, the creditor must be remitted to the tribunals of the debtor-country, or to diplomatic negotiations. If this doctrine could be embedded in international law, it is obvious that Mr. Roosevelt would have no occasion to offer to perform the office of revenue collector and distributor on behalf of the Dominican Republic.

Secretary Root goes to Rio de Janeiro for the purpose of convincing the Pan-American Conference, first, that there is not the slightest chance of securing the assent of the European nations soon to be represented at The Hague to the Calvo Doctrine, inasmuch as the most important of them are committed to the opposite principle; and, secondly, that no greater misfortune than the universal adoption of that doctrine could overtake the Latin-American States, for, from that moment, their credit on the European stock-exchanges would be reduced to zero. Should Mr. Root be able to make good these two averments, he will find it relatively easy to demonstrate that Mr. Roosevelt's substitute for the Calvo Doctrine provides the only method of escape from a difficult and dangerous dilemma.